How to manipulate standards

Daniel J. Bernstein

Verizon Communications Inc.

manipulate standards

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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We can still see everything.

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Can't modify signed data but can track in many other ways.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Sabotaging crypto details

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a white paper for the black hat

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

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Textbook key exchange using standard point P on a standard elliptic curve E:



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Our partner Jerry's
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

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

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

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



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

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

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Extensive ECC literature:
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Assume that public will accept any E not publicly broken.



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

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

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

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