Sorting integer arrays: security, speed, and verification

D. J. Bernstein

University of Illinois at Chicago, Ruhr-University Bochum

Bob's laptop screen:

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From: Alice

Thank you for your

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Bob assumes this message is something Alice actually sent.

But today's "security" systems fail to guarantee this property. Attacker could have modified or forged the message.

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
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TCB stops each VM from touching data in other VMs.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
### Important for Alice and Bob to share the same secret k.

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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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Solution 2:

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


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
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



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
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


No more shared secret kbut Alice still has secret a. Cryptography requires TCB to protect secrecy of keys, even if user has no other secrets.

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
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
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
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
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
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## Constant-time software

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Solution 2: Public-key signatures.




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
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
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# Typical literature of

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Try to push attack This becomes very

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## Constant-time software

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
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
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


- Easy constant-time exercise
- Warning: C standard allows
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


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Foundation of solution: a **comparator** sorting 2 integers.

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Easy constant-time exercise in C. Warning: C standard allows compiler to screw this up.

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# Combine sorting


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
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


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Even easier exercise in asm.

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




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
Easy constant-time exercise in C. Warning: C standard allows compiler to screw this up.

Even easier exercise in asm.

Combine comparators into a sorting network for more inputs.

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
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


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
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
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
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Combine comparators into a sorting network for more inputs.

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
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# Positions of comparators in a sorting network are independent of the input. Naturally constant-time.

Combine comparators into a **sorting network** for more inputs.

Example of a sorting network:




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
Positions of comparators in a sorting network are independent of the input. Naturally constant-time.

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But  $(n^2 - n)/2$  comparators produce complaints about performance as *n* increases.

Combine comparators into a sorting network for more inputs.

Example of a sorting network:




Positions of comparators in a sorting network are independent of the input. Naturally constant-time. But  $(n^2 - n)/2$  comparators produce complaints about performance as *n* increases. Speed is a serious issue in the post-quantum competition. "Cost" is evaluation criterion; "we'd like to stress this once again on the forum that we'd really like to see more platformoptimized implementations"; etc.

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
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17 void int32\_sort(int32 \*x,int64 n) { int64 t,p,q,i; if (n < 2) return; t = 1;while (t < n - t) t += t;for (p = t;p > 0;p >>= 1) { for (i = 0; i < n - p; ++i)if (!(i & p)) minmax(x+i,x+i+p); for (q = t; q > p; q >>= 1)for (i = 0; i < n - q; ++i)if (!(i & p)) minmax(x+i+p,x+i+q); }

Previous slide: C to 1973 Knuth "merge which is a simplified 1968 Batcher "ode sorting networks.

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p = t;p > 0;p >>= 1) {
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<pre>minmax(x+i,x+i+p);</pre>
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or (i = 0;i < n - q;++i)
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


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
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
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vectorization (for Haswell)

Constant-time sorting code included in 2017 Bernstein–Chuengsatiansup–

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"NTRU Prime" software release

revamped for higher speed

New: djbsort

constant-time sorting code

# The slowdown for


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The slowdown for constant time

How much speed did we lose by refusing to use variable-time quicksort, radix sort, etc.?

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Answer: well-known trends in CPU design, reflecting fundamental hardware costs of various operations.

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- Every cycle, Haswell core can do 8 "min" ops on 32-bit integers + 8 "max" ops on 32-bit integers.

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Loading a 32-bit integer from a random address: much slower.

Conditional branch: much slower.

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# <u>Verification</u>

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- Test the sorting software on
- random inputs, increasing in
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## Verification

Sorting software is in the TCB. Does it work correctly?

random inputs, increasing inputs, decreasing inputs. Seems to work.

# Test the sorting software on many

How can an  $n(\log n)^2$  algorithm beat standard *n* log *n* algorithms?

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Sorting software is in the TCB. Does it work correctly?

random inputs, increasing inputs,

But are there *occasional* inputs where this sorting software fails to sort correctly?

History: Many security problems involve occasional inputs where TCB works incorrectly.

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
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
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
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
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






# fully unrolled code

# new peephole c



# new sorting ver

# yes, code works


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## normal compiler

## symbolic execution

# new peephole optimizer

## new sorting verifier

## ion

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sorting software on many inputs, increasing inputs, ng inputs. Seems to work.

there *occasional* inputs nis sorting software sort correctly?

Many security problems occasional inputs CB works incorrectly.

For each used n (e.g., 768): C code normal compiler machine code symbolic execution fully unrolled code new peephole optimizer unrolled min-max code new sorting verifier yes, code works

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
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
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For each used n (e.g., 768):



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


## Symbolic execution:

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


Symbolic execution: use existing angr.io toolkit, with several tiny new patches for eliminating byte splitting, adding

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# a few missing vector instructions.

For each used n (e.g., 768):




Symbolic execution: use existing angr.io toolkit,

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Peephole optimizer: recognize instruction patterns equivalent to min, max.

# with several tiny new patches for eliminating byte splitting, adding a few missing vector instructions.


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Symbolic execution: use existing angr.io toolkit, with several tiny new patches for eliminating byte splitting, adding a few missing vector instructions. Peephole optimizer: recognize instruction patterns equivalent to min, max. Sorting verifier: decompose DAG into merging networks. Verify each merging network using generalization of 2007 Even–Levi–Litman, correction of 1990 Chung–Ravikumar.

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Current djbsort release (verified fast int32 on AVX verified portable int32, fast uint32, fast float32):

- sorting.cr.yp.to
- Includes the sorting code; automatic build-time tests; simple benchmarking progra verification tools.
- Web site shows how to
- use the verification tools.
- Next release planned: verified ARM NEON code.

Symbolic execution: use existing angr.io toolkit, with several tiny new patches for eliminating byte splitting, adding a few missing vector instructions.

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sorting.cr.yp.to

Includes the sorting code; automatic build-time tests; simple benchmarking program; verification tools.

Web site shows how to use the verification tools.

Next release planned: verified ARM NEON code.