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cr.yp.to/papers.html#ntrw

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Issue 3, my focus today: Are there chosen-ciphertext attacks beyond the IND-CCA2 model?

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Introduces principle of factoring "any generic transformation aiming at a goal beyond IND-CCA2" out of KEM specifications, to simplify design and review.